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THE LIABILITY OF PROVIDERS OF 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN 
NEGLIGENCE 
ANTHONY GRAY∗ 
In Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna the High 
Court considered the question of the liability in tort of a mental health 
provider for the actions of someone whom it had briefly treated. After 
involuntarily detaining the individual under relevant legislation, the service 
released the individual into the care of a friend. The person released killed 
his friend. The High Court allowed an appeal against a finding of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal that the mental health service provider had 
owed, and had breached, legal obligations to the family of the person killed, 
denying compensation to the family on the basis that the service provider 
did not owe family members a duty of care. It will be argued that the High 
Court was wrong to deny that a mental health service provider could owe, 
or did owe, a duty of care to victims of those to whom the service provider 
provided services. The Court reached its decision utilising reasoning 
contrary to that of other cases which have involved questions of the liability 
of public authorities. The decision travels the well-worn path of denying 
that a public authority owes a duty of care to the public that it serves by 
asserting the inconsistency of obligations more apparent than real. The 
decision shows judicial reluctance to hold public authorities to the legal 
standards expected of other service providers, a reluctance that must be 
challenged. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The law continues to struggle with the application of negligence principles in 
the context of loss caused by public authorities. This is relevant to the focus of 
the current article, since mental health services are in almost all cases 
provided by public authorities. Until the 1930s the law was content to accept 
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that certain categories of relationship gave rise to civil obligations recognised 
by the law,1 apply strict rules forbidding recovery in other categories of case,2 
but deny a generalised duty of care. This changed in 1932 upon acceptance of 
a generalised duty of care principle based on the concept of reasonable 
foreseeability and the ‘neighbours’ principle,3 together with statutory reform.4 
The difficulty has been that at least in some circumstances, the Donoghue 
principle is seen to provide, or at least to raise fears of, too much liability, or 
open-ended liability which might have undesirable social consequences.5 This 
objection has sometimes generally,6 and sometimes in relation to particular 
categories of case, led to the development of principles that make it harder in 
particular cases to successfully bring an action. Examples of the latter have 
involved claims of ‘nervous shock’,7 claims for purely financial loss,8 and 
1 Heaven v Pender (1882–83) LR 11 QBD 503. 
2 For example, the doctrine of common employment makes it more difficult for employees to 
successfully sue their employers, and the defence of contributory negligence applies as a 
complete defence: Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 103 ER 926; Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 
Mees and Wels 1; 150 ER 1030. For a case of non-liability of highway authorities with 
respect to non-feasance see: Parsons v The Vestry of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green (1867–68) 
LR 3 CP 56, 60 (Willes J); Buckle v Bayswater Road Board (1936) 57 CLR 259. For a denial 
that a property owner owes a duty of care to users of a nearby road, with respect to straying 
animals not known to be dangerous see: Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341; State Government 
Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617. For a denial of a claim by one person 
based on the death of another: Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 170 ER 1033; Woolworths 
Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603. 
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
4 For example, the reform embodied in the legislation known colloquially as ‘Lord Campbell’s 
Act’ to overcome most of the impact of the decision in Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 
170 ER 1033; and see generally Peter Handford, ‘Lord Campbell and the Fatal Accidents Act’ 
(2013) 129 The Law Quarterly Review 420; in the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24A (abolition of 
doctrine of common employment) and in the civil liability legislation in some jurisdictions 
following the insurance ‘crisis’ of the early 21st century: eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
and other state equivalents. 
5 In other words, ‘liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’: Ultramares Corp v Touche, 174 NE 441, 444 (Cardozo J) (NY Ct App, 
1932). 
6 For example, through the use of the notion of ‘proximity’ as a control mechanism Gala v 
Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243, or the explicit consideration of policy reasons (if any) for the 
denial of a duty of care: Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; Caparo 
Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. Subsequently proximity was rejected: Hill v Van 
Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 (acknowledging that the use of proximity was not identical in 
United Kingdom and Australian law). More recently the use of concepts such as ‘control’ and 
‘vulnerability’ have been adopted: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
7 Examples of ‘control mechanisms’ used here have included the concept of a person with 
normal fortitude, the concept of a ‘sudden shock’ and concepts of direct perception and 
immediate aftermath: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310. 
Subsequently these fell out of favour in the common law: Tame v New South Wales (2002) 
211 CLR 317. 
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claims against public authorities.9 The recent High Court decision which 
provoked the analysis and criticism in this article — Hunter and New England 
Local Health District v McKenna (‘McKenna’)10 — involved both the first 
and third types of these ‘difficult’ cases: that is, a claim for nervous shock and 
a claim against a public authority. The High Court has also noted that it is 
‘exceptional’ to find one person liable for the actions or omissions of 
another,11 and traditionally has distinguished between actions and omissions. 
That is also a feature of the current context.  
This article is structured as follows. Under heading II below important details 
of the relevant case, and the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeal and 
High Court, are discussed. Under heading III the case is placed in its context. 
It is the kind of case that would typically be brought against a public 
authority. There is a long history of the court treating cases against public 
authorities differently from other cases. Even today, there are suggestions that 
the principles applied to public authorities should differ from those applicable 
to other bodies. Utilitarian policy arguments, fears of indeterminate liability or 
suggestions of inconsistent obligations are often raised. Equivalent authorities 
in the United Kingdom and United States are considered, specifically on the 
question of policy arguments regarding public authority liability, possible 
inconsistency of obligations, and indeterminacy fears. This does not imply 
that negligence law in Australia and those other jurisdictions is the same, or 
should be the same. Clearly, there are major differences in the law of 
8 For instance, a requirement of an assumption of responsibility and (reasonable) reliance: 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
9 For example, in the past distinctions have been made between policy and operational 
decisions (public authorities enjoying virtual immunity from suit for the former kind of 
decision) and the so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness principle has been used to 
determine the liability of a public authority: Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 
192 CLR 431, 443 (Brennan CJ) (although cf Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 43A; Stovin v 
Wise [1996] AC 923; and the fact that non-feasance was not actionable (overturned in 
Australia in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 (this often assisted public 
authorities). Legislation abolishing past Crown immunity from suit includes the Petition of 
Rights Act 1860 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK), Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64, 
Claims Against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912 (NSW) s 4; Crown Proceedings 
Act 1980 (Qld) s 8; Crown Proceedings Act 1958 (Vic) s 23; Crown Proceedings Act 1972 
(SA) s 10; Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s 5; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 
64. These legislative developments indicate a significant change in how the law regards 
liability of public authorities, and whether they should be subject to special rules, or subject to 
the same rules as other organisations, and individuals. 
10 (2014) 253 CLR 270. 
11 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 262 (Dixon J) (excepting vicarious liability). See also 
Michael v Chief Constable South Wales Police [2015] 2 WLR 343, 366 [97] (Lord Toulson, 
with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed). 
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negligence between Australia and the United Kingdom, for example.12 Under 
heading IV the reasoning employed by the High Court in McKenna is 
considered in more depth. It is concluded that the decision is weak because of 
an incomplete consideration of relevant legislation, assumptions about the 
effect of decisions that is at the level of speculation rather than validated 
claim, and an apparent keenness to find an inconsistency of obligations which 
does not in fact exist. 
II SIGNIFICANT FACTS, DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL 
AND HIGH COURT 
Mr Pettigrove had suffered mental illness for at least 20 years. He had 
suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was being treated for this 
condition in regional Victoria. While in New South Wales with a friend Rose, 
he was taken by ambulance to the hospital, primarily because he was 
experiencing ‘physical jerks’.13 Upon Pettigrove’s arrival at 4.30 am, a 
hospital doctor contacted a Dr Coombes who advised the doctor to complete 
the documentation to allow Pettigrove to be involuntarily detained in the 
hospital under that state’s mental health legislation, and to give Pettigrove an 
injection of an anti-psychotic drug and a sedative.14 In order that Pettigrove be 
so detained, it was necessary to obtain appropriate authorisations. Dr 
Coombes, who observed Pettigrove at the hospital, signed a document to the 
effect that Pettigrove was mentally ill within the meaning of the relevant Act, 
as did the superintendent of the hospital at the time. The form was completed 
by a duty doctor, Dr Saw, who noted that Pettigrove was suffering suicidal 
ideation, and seemed to question whether Pettigrove was suffering psychotic 
depression by writing a question mark after those words in his notes. His 
notes included the words ‘concern harm to self/others’. Dr Saw indicated on 
the forms that the patient’s detention was necessary for his own protection and 
12 For example, while the United Kingdom applies the three-stage Caparo approach (derived 
from Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605), including considerations of 
proximity, the use of proximity in Australia fell into disfavour as evidenced by Perre v Apand 
(1998) 198 CLR 180. Australian law does not apply the three stage Caparo approach, 
preferring instead a salient features approach to questions of negligence liability: Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540. Some argue that the distinction between 
proximity and salient features is marginal: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 178 (Dawson 
J), 190 (Toohey J). Australian (common) law has abolished past immunity for acts of non-
feasance: Brodie v Singleton (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
13 McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270. 
14 This summary of facts is obtained from the judgment of Macfarlan JA (with whom Beazley P 
agreed) in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: [2013] NSWCA 476, [13]. The High Court 
did not refer to the facts in detail in its judgment: ibid. 
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that of others. A form that Dr Coombes signed confirmed that Pettigrove had 
presented with ‘depression (and was) psychotic’, and that the principal 
diagnosis was ‘exacerbation of chronic paranoid schizophrenia’.15 
Later that morning, an Assessment of Current Presentation form was 
completed by a clinical nurse. The assessment reiterated the ‘physical jerks’ 
symptoms and explained them as psychotic phenomena. It recorded the 
patient reporting hearing voices that bothered him, and that he had a history of 
not taking his medication.16 Another form completed by an unidentified nurse, 
rated Pettigrove two out of seven on an ‘overactive, aggressive, disruptive or 
agitated’ scale and three out of seven on a ‘problems with hallucinations and 
delusions’ scale.17 A similar form completed by another nurse the following 
day scored Pettigrove zero and one respectively on these criteria.18 
The legislation at the time required that any person involuntarily detained 
under mental health legislation had to be examined within 12 hours of 
admission by the hospital’s medical superintendent.19 They could be kept in 
detention only if the superintendent certified that the person was mentally ill 
or disordered. The superintendent, Dr Wu, stated that Pettigrove was mentally 
ill, noting that she had observed ‘bizarre behaviour, inappropriate eye 
movement plus verbal activity, suicidal ideation, unresponsive at times, and 
concern harm to self/others’, with a conclusion of ‘schizophrenia’. The 
Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) required a further review to be conducted by 
a psychiatrist. Dr Coombes did this, concluding that Pettigrove was mentally 
ill.20 His notes recorded his awareness of Pettigrove’s long history of paranoid 
schizophrenia, the doctor having sighted Pettigrove’s medical history. This 
medical history was extensive, and included Pettigrove’s history of non-
compliance with medication, jumping in front of trucks, lying face down on 
roadways, talking to himself, and likely auditory hallucinations.21 Dr 
Coombes noted that the patient looked perplexed and bewildered, and had not 
taken medication for at least 7 months. He concluded that the patient should 
be detained overnight, then transferred to his mother’s home in rural Victoria 
with his friend Rose. Dr Coombes then arranged for Pettigrove to be taken 
from the assessment area to the secured mental health unit, arranging two 
‘solid males from emergency’. 
15 Ibid [17]. 
16 Ibid [18]. 
17 Ibid [19]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) s 29. Ibid. 
20 Ibid [22]. 
21 Ibid [28]–[31]. 
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On the day that Pettigrove was involuntarily detained, Dr Coombes spoke 
with Pettigrove, Pettigrove’s mother, and Rose. He discussed various 
treatment options with Pettigrove’s mother and Rose. Dr Coombes noted that 
Pettigrove’s mother wanted him home in Victoria, and that Rose was happy to 
drive him there. It was agreed that Pettigrove would be detained in the New 
South Wales hospital overnight, and that Rose would then drive with 
Pettigrove to his mother’s home in Victoria, near where he had been receiving 
medical treatment. This would involve a car trip of almost 1000 kilometres. 
Dr Coombes expressed in his notes a strong preference for the pair to travel a 
route with psychiatric services along it, so that they could receive assistance if 
needed.22 
Following that meeting, Dr Coombes completed another form. He ticked 
boxes indicating that there was no foreseeable risk of Pettigrove inflicting 
harm on himself or others.23 He again referred to the patient’s long-term 
schizophrenia, noting that the patient was ‘not obviously hallucinating’. He 
indicated that there was no apparent risk to Pettigrove or to others, and that 
Pettigrove was to be given no medication upon discharge.24 This was 
apparently because Pettigrove and Rose would be sharing the driving, and Dr 
Coombes did not want to make Pettigrove drowsy. If Pettigrove had been 
given a depot injection prior to commencement of the journey, it would have 
reduced the risk of ‘something untoward’ happening on the journey. 
During the night in which Pettigrove was detained in the New South Wales 
facility, he was observed by nursing staff. They noted that he remained awake 
at all times during that evening, and appeared to be speaking to himself 
loudly. When nursing staff approached the door to his room, he would 
quieten.25 
On the next day, Pettigrove was discharged into the care of Rose. Rose 
arrived at the hospital a few hours later than had been agreed. This affected 
their journey to Pettigrove’s mother’s home, since Rose’s late arrival meant, 
significantly, that the two set off later than anticipated. This increased the risk 
of something going wrong during the journey, because evidence suggested 
that the risk of someone with paranoid schizophrenia suffering an ‘attack’ was 
higher at night than during the day. During this journey, Pettigrove started to 
believe that Rose had killed him in a previous life. He strangled and killed 
Rose in the vehicle. Subsequently Pettigrove committed suicide.  
22 Ibid [23]. 
23 Ibid [25]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid [35]. 
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The legal claim was brought by members of Rose’s family. His mother and 
sisters claimed that they had developed a psychiatric condition as a result of 
what had happened to Rose, and that the medical authority was liable to them 
in negligence. The trial judge found that the medical authority had not 
breached its duty of care to the family.26 The Court of Appeal found by 
majority (Macfarlan JA and Beazley P, Garling J dissenting) that the medical 
authority had breached the duty of care it owed to the family.27 The High 
Court found that the medical authority had not owed a duty of care to the 
family.28 
A Court of Appeal 
By a majority of 2–1, the Court held that Rose’s mother and sisters were 
entitled to compensation based on a breach of the (common law) duty of care 
owed to them by the medical authority.29 Macfarlan JA expressed the majority 
view, in terms with which Beazley P expressed agreement. Macfarlan JA 
considered the elements of a negligence action. He did so in the context of 
whether the medical authority had owed a duty of care to Rose, rather than 
whether they had owed one to members of Rose’s family. The assumption 
was made that if the hospital had owed a duty of care to Rose, it would have 
owed one to his family.30 
Macfarlan JA found that a duty of care had existed, noting that the trial judge 
had assumed that a relevant duty of care existed. The duty of care he accepted 
was a duty owed by the hospital to Rose to take reasonable care to prevent 
Pettigrove from physically harming Rose.31 He referred to indicia of a duty of 
care obligation owed by one to another, including: the defendant’s control 
over the risk of harm, the degree of vulnerability of those to whom the duty is 
26  McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2012] NSWDC 19. 
27 McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 476.  
28  McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270. 
29 This was not a claim for breach of statutory duty: McKenna v Hunter & New England Local 
Health District [2013] NSWCA 476 
30 Ibid [85], based on the defendant’s concession; Macfarlan JA said it was sufficient to 
consider whether the hospital owed a duty of care to Rose, since the hospital did not argue 
that the question of whether a duty of care was owed to (a) Rose and (b) his family might 
have different answers. The High Court cast doubt on the correctness of this approach: 
McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270 [14] (French CJ, Hayne, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), in terms 
with which the present author agrees. It is not necessary to resolve this issue for present 
purposes. 
31 McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 476, [108]. 
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said to be owed, and the consistency of the duty of care with other 
obligations.32  
In finding that a duty of care existed, Macfarlan JA cited the decision of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hunter Area Health Service v Presland 
(‘Presland’).33 Briefly, the case there against the Hunter Area Health Service 
involved a psychiatric patient who had been released from its care and who 
then killed his brother’s fiancé within six hours of release. The patient had 
been confined under mental health legislation. The patient sued the medical 
authority for releasing him when it did, claiming compensation for the mental 
anguish he suffered directly from the killing and consequences that flowed 
from it. The majority in that case found that the defendant did not owe the 
plaintiff a duty of care.  
Macfarlan JA here relied on the dissenting judgment of Spigelman CJ in 
Presland, who found that a duty of care existed in that case, based on control 
and vulnerability. Spigelman CJ found no conflict between the asserted 
common law duty and the relevant obligations of authorities under the state’s 
mental health legislation.34 The majority in Presland made it clear that its 
decision did not preclude an action different in kind from the one at issue 
there. Santow JA specifically found that an action might be brought by a third 
party who had suffered serious physical harm due to the actions of the person 
released.35 
Macfarlan JA found that the medical authority had breached its duty of care. 
He was not satisfied that representatives of the authority could, on one day, be 
convinced that Pettigrove warranted being involuntarily detained under the 
mental health legislation, and then apparently be satisfied the very next day 
that the patient could be released without significant risk. Dr Coombes had 
not scheduled another appointment prior to release. The patient’s symptoms 
were likely to fluctuate, so observations over just a few hours were 
insufficient to assess the state of mind of this psychotic patient. The admitting 
authorities had noted that the patient was at risk of harm to himself or others. 
The overnight nurses had observed the patient to be in an agitated state. Dr 
Coombes obviously had some concerns about the journey, but was apparently 
satisfied that the existence of mental health facilities along the intended path 
would ameliorate the risk. It was common knowledge that the danger of a 
psychotic episode increased at night. Dr Coombes knew it was likely that 
32 Ibid [93], [104]–[105].  
33 [2005] NSWCA 33. 
34 Ibid [35]–[41]. 
35 Ibid [36].  
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Pettigrove and Rose would be in the car together at night, given the length of 
journey involved. Dr Coombes declined to give Pettigrove a depot injection 
which would have reduced the risk of an incident. He knew that Pettigrove 
had a history of not taking medication, and had not had a depot injection for 
seven months prior to admission. Macfarlan JA concluded that at the time of 
discharge, there was a foreseeable and not insignificant risk of Pettigrove 
causing harm to Rose. The risk of very serious harm to Rose was high. The 
hospital had had the capacity to detain Pettigrove for longer and it would not 
have imposed an unreasonable burden upon it to do so. As regards the social 
utility of releasing Pettigrove, whilst the legislation did require Pettigrove to 
be treated with measures that were least invasive of his human rights, the Act 
was concerned with both the control of mental health patients undergoing 
treatment and the protection of the patient and others. Macfarlan JA decided 
that the medical authority had caused the death of Rose. In the terms of 
section 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), its actions in releasing 
Pettigrove were a ‘necessary condition’ of the occurrence of the harm in the 
sense that the opportunity for Pettigrove to harm Rose arose only because of 
the hospital’s decision to release Pettigrove.36 
Garling J (dissenting) denied that a duty of care was owed. Although the 
parties apparently conceded that, if the hospital had owed a duty of care to 
Rose, it had also owed one to his family, Garling J found this concession 
inappropriate. The law had always taken a narrower approach to claims for 
psychiatric injury, a position maintained by section 30 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW). However, his main finding was that the hospital did not owe 
a duty of care to Rose. Garling J found that the Act was expressly focused on 
care, treatment and control of the mentally ill. It did not expressly refer to 
protection of the public, or include it as an objective to be pursued under the 
Act. It reflected a sentiment that those suffering from mental health issues 
should be treated wherever possible in community-based settings on an 
informal and voluntary basis; involuntary detention and treatment were a last 
resort.  
Garling J noted the common law’s general antipathy towards suggestions that 
one person is legally required to prevent another person from causing injury, 
and the important distinction between not causing harm and not preventing 
harm. The legal recognition of an obligation to someone such as Rose would 
conflict with the social obligations the hospital had to patients such as 
Pettigrove; for this reason no duty of care was owed.37  
36 McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 476, [184]–[187]. 
37 Ibid [257]. 
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B High Court 
All five members of the High Court who were hearing the case allowed an 
appeal against the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.38 The 
primary reason was the Appeal Court’s finding that the hospital did not owe 
the plaintiffs a duty of care.39 The High Court noted the emphasis that the 
relevant mental health legislation placed on measures minimally invasive of a 
patient’s rights, dignity and self-respect. Specifically, the power to 
involuntarily detain a mentally ill individual under the legislation could only 
be exercised where the medical superintendent believed that no other care of a 
less restrictive kind was appropriate and reasonably available.40  
The High Court held that to impose a duty of care on persons such as the 
appellant (the hospital) would conflict with these provisions of the mental 
health legislation. That legislation required the focus to be exclusively on the 
patient whereas the common law duty would require the hospital to have 
regard to others with whom the patient might come into contact. Often, the 
risk of a mentally ill person acting irrationally would not be insignificant, and 
the consequences could be serious. As a result, in such cases, a decision 
maker would be minded to involuntarily detain, or continue to detain, a person 
suffering from mental illness. This common law position conflicted with clear 
indications in the legislation that involuntarily detention was a last resort. This 
conflict was fatal to the existence of the posited common law duty of care.41 
Elsewhere, the High Court cast doubt on the correctness of the approach in the 
lower courts which had treated as equivalent a putative claim by Rose himself 
38 McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270.  
39 This decision was in line with  the recent low success rate of plaintiffs in negligence actions 
in the High Court observed by Stewart and Stuhmcke and the even lower success rate of 
plaintiffs seeking compensation against public authorities: Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, 
‘High Court Negligence Cases 2000–10’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 585. Because the 
High Court decided the case on the issue of a duty of care, it did not need to consider, and did 
not consider, general provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) regarding liability for 
nervous shock and provisions regarding exercise of statutory powers. As a result, given that 
this article primarily concerns the decision in the case and the broader context of that decision 
and comparable decisions, those statutory provisions will not be dwelt on here. 
40 On deinstitutionalisation in the mental health context, see Jonathan Bach, ‘Requiring Due 
Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalisation: Toward a Common Law Approach to 
Mental Health Care Reform’ (1989) 98 Yale Law Journal 1153. 
41 McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270, 281–2 [29]–[31]. The finding that no duty of care was owed 
meant that the High Court did not consider whether the duty of care had been breached, what 
its precise scope might be, or whether the duty of care might be indeterminate. Nor was the 
Court required to consider the application of other sections of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) in relation to claims for psychiatric injury and claims against public authorities.  
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and a claim by his family.42 It hinted at indeterminacy issues, briefly raising 
the concern that if a duty of care was held to be owed to Rose and his 
relatives, it would be difficult to rule out claims by anyone with whom 
someone such as Pettigrove might come into contact post-release.43 
III PRECEDENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A BODY 
WITH STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OWES A DUTY OF 
CARE 
The above litigation should be placed in a broader context. It concerns 
questions of the liability of public authorities, since the overwhelming 
majority of mental health services are provided by public authorities. The case 
law in this area is deep and extensive. Public authorities are often the subject 
of legislation, thus frequently raising the question of whether the existence of 
a common law duty of care was intended by parliament to apply to them, 
whether such a duty would clash with statutory provisions, and whether such 
a duty would alter the exercise of powers or duties under the legislation in a 
socially harmful manner. Some argue that the common law of tort cannot and 
should not be applied in the context of public authorities, and that public law 
concepts, such as so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness,44 should be 
instead applied to questions of the liability of public bodies. 
It should be acknowledged that the case at hand is arguably not a ‘public 
authority case’ but rather a case involving medical negligence, psychiatrists 
having special powers under mental health legislation. No doubt, reasonable 
minds will differ on this. It is the premise of this article that this is a case 
involving medical negligence, but a particular kind of medical negligence — 
namely the negligence that occurs when a statutory power under the mental 
42 Ibid 278 [15]. The High Court might have drawn support for this approach from the earlier 
decision of Chester v The Council of the Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1, a tragic 
case involving the drowning of a child in a trench dug by a Council. His mother claimed 
damages for a psychiatric illness she claimed she had suffered after observing her child being 
found in and recovered from the trench. The Court denied the woman’s claim, but opined that 
if the son had lived but merely suffered injuries, he would have had a claim, as would any 
dependants of his, had he been older: 7 (Latham CJ), 11 (Rich J). It is submitted that the High 
Court was correct, on both occasions, to treat as separate and independent claims the claim (if 
any) of the immediate victim, and the claim of those who had suffered psychiatric illness as a 
result of the injury to the immediate victim. (This is not intended to indicate that the author 
agrees with the outcome in Chester, which denied to the boy’s mother a claim in nervous 
shock on the basis that a person of normal constitution would not suffer such a psychiatric 
injury in such circumstances). 
43 McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270, 278 [16]. 
44 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. 
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health legislation ought to have been exercised in a different way. For this 
reason, the article argues that other cases that have considered negligence 
claims around the exercise or non-exercise of statutory powers are relevant to 
the current discussion. It is significant that the case was brought against a 
public authority with statutory powers and duties. 
As indicated earlier, in the past the Crown, and bodies entitled to the shield of 
the Crown, were considered to be immune from liability in tort. This, together 
with an immunity from statute, was of ancient provenance, with the classic 
reference being to a quote in 1615 that ‘the King cannot do a wrong’.45 This 
immunity from suit was limited and then abolished in the United Kingdom in 
1860 and 1947 respectively.46 Its rejection is implicitly reflected in section 64 
of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and is expressed in various state laws.47 
Despite this abolition, judicial reluctance to find government bodies, 
particularly (in this context) government bodies with statutory responsibilities, 
liable in tort remains strong.48 Evidence of this reluctance includes the fact 
45 Magdalen College Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 66, 72a; 77 ER 1235, 1243 (Lord Coke); adopted 
by Griffith CJ in Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners v Ryan (1911) 13 CLR 358, 365 
(Barton J to like effect, 370). If it were a word, rather than a phrase, what Coke said might be 
described as a contranym, because the phrase used can be interpreted in opposite directions. 
Specifically, it might mean that no court could find that the monarch had done a wrong, 
because it was not possible; alternatively it might mean that monarchs, like the rest of the 
population, ought not (more accurate than ‘cannot’) do a wrong. The suggestion of Crown 
immunity from liability and statute gained a footing (R v Cook (1790) 3 TR 519, 521.), and a 
strong presumption against the Crown being bound by statute was accepted and applied for 
many years: Province of Bombay v Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [1947] AC 
58. There remains such a presumption in Australia, though it was weakened substantially in 
Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1. Crown immunity from suit was abolished by 
legislation: see Petition of Rights Act 1860 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK); 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 64; William Holdsworth, ‘The History of Remedies against the 
Crown’ (1922) 38 The Law Quarterly Review 141.  
46 The Petition of Rights Act 1860 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK). In 1866 the 
House of Lords conceded that a public body could be liable in tort: Mersey Docks & Harbour 
Board Trustees v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93; Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878) 
LR 3 App Cas 430, 455–6 (Lord Blackburn): ‘it is now thoroughly well established that no 
action will lie for doing that which the legislature has authorised, if it be done without 
negligence, although it does not occasion damage to anyone; but an action does lie for doing 
that which the legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently’. 
47 Claims Against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912 (NSW) s 4; Crown Proceedings 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 23; Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld) s 8; Crown Proceedings Act 1972 
(SA) s 10; Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s 5; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 
64; Greg Taylor, ‘John Baker’s Act: The South Australian Origins of Claims-Against-the-
Government Legislation’ (2004) 27(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 736. 
48 ‘There may be special factors applicable to a statutory authority which negative a duty of 
care that a private individual would owe in apparently similar circumstances’: Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 34 (McHugh J). Recently a 
majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court denied that a body set up as a protective 
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that public authorities have enjoyed special treatment in the past, including 
immunity from liability for acts of non-feasance49 (such immunity abolished 
in Australia in 2001).50 The courts have also made a distinction between 
policy decisions (which enjoyed at common law51 and continue to enjoy in 
statute greater protection from civil action),52 and merely operational 
decisions, where the prospects of civil action are greater. The usual fear in the 
law of tort of ‘floodgates litigation’ appears particularly likely to be aroused 
in this context. The power of some public authorities is clearly very 
significant, creating the possibility of liability on various fronts; a wide range 
of individuals and organisations might be affected by what the public 
authority does nor does not do.53 Local authorities sometimes need to make 
important policy decisions that a court might be ill-equipped to review in 
terms of negligence liability, even if it were minded to do so and it was within 
judicial remit to do so.54 The defence of such actions might drain the 
resources of the organisation away from more positive activities, given 
limited public funding.55 There is evident utilitarian concern with permitting 
negligence claims in areas which could compromise the performance of 
important public functions or have implications for the greater good, 
including (unproductive) diversion of resources.  
system with public resources should be held liable in negligence for the actions of a third 
party not under its control, although the body might contain defects, be at fault, or have failed 
to achieve its purpose/s: Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 WLR 343, 
369 [114]–[115] (Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and 
Lord Hodge agreed). 
49 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057, 1068 [38] (Lord 
Hoffmann), 1075–6 [65] (Lord Scott), 1080 [80] (Lord Rodger), 1087 [102] (Lord Brown). 
50 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
51 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 438 (Gibbs CJ), 469 (Mason J), 
500 (Deane J); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 358 (Toohey J), cf 393 
(Gummow J). The existence of a ‘policy’ exception was rejected by Gaudron McHugh and 
Gummow JJ in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 560.  
52 See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s 38; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110. 
53 This has been recognised as being particularly acute in relation to police investigations: Tame 
v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 335 (Gleeson CJ), 396 (Gummow and Kirby JJ), 
418 (Hayne J); Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] 3 WLR 593. 
54 These factors are explored in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Home Office v Dorset Yacht 
Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, 1067. 
55 Van Colle v Hertfordshire Police [2008] 3 WLR 593, 624 [89] (Lord Phillips), 633 [133] 
(Lord Brown). 
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In the latter part of the 20th century there developed a practice of judges 
applying,56 with the support of scholars57 principles of public law, particularly 
administrative law, to questions of the common law liability of public 
authorities. To some extent this practice is designed to protect public 
authorities from liability for their actions or omissions.58 This approach has 
more recently been criticised by judges59 and scholars.60 On the other hand, 
there are factors that point towards the same legal principles applying to 
public authorities as apply to other parties, at least as a general starting 
principle.61 For example, the rule of law, and the statutory removal of former 
immunity from suit for the Crown, might suggest this.   
It is problematic to apply principles developed in the specific context of 
judicial review (assessing the legality of action and whether the authority has 
acted within power) to the different context of a private law claim where the 
56 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, 1067 (Lord Diplock); Stovin v Wise 
[1996] AC 923, 936 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Slynn agreed), 953 (Lord Hoffmann, 
with whom Lords Goff and Jauncey agreed); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 
192 CLR 431, 443 (Brennan CJ).  
57 Tom Cornford, Towards a Public Law of Tort (Ashgate, 2008) 142–51. 
58 For instance, this may be because a court is ill-equipped to revisit decisions based on a 
careful balancing of competing priorities and interests that the public authority’s decision, act 
or omission may represent: John Doyle and Jonathon Redwood, ‘The Common Law Liability 
of Public Authorities: The Interface Between Public Law and Private Law’ (1999) 7 Tort Law 
Review 30, 34; Cornford, ibid, 208: ‘public law concepts often seem to have been used to 
reduce the likelihood of liability’; ‘a coherent, principled control mechanism has to be found 
for limiting this area of potential liability (public authority liability. The powers conferred on 
public authorities permeate so many fields that a private law duty in all cases, sounding in 
damages, would be (un)acceptable’: Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 936 (Lord Nicholls). 
59 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550, 571–2 (Lord Slynn, with whom 
Lords Nolan and Steyn agreed); X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 
736 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 
619, 652–3 (Lord Slynn for the Court); Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee 
(1999) 200 CLR 1, 18 (Gaudron J), 35 (McHugh J), 78 (Kirby J). 
60 S H Bailey and M J Bowman, ‘Public Authority Negligence Revisited’ (2000) 59(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 85 (‘Bailey and Bowman’); M J Bowman and S H Bailey, 
‘Negligence in the Realms of Public Law – A Positive Obligation to Rescue’ [1984] PL 277 ; 
Donal Nolan, ‘Varying the Standard of Care in Negligence’ (2013) 72(3) Cambridge Law 
Journal 651, 669; Mark Aronson, ‘Government Liability in Negligence’ (2008) 32 Melbourne 
University Law Review 44, 80; Stephen Bailey, ‘Public Liability in Negligence: The 
Continued Search for Coherence’ (2006) 26(2) Legal Studies 155, 156: ‘it seems increasingly 
to have been accepted that the ordinary principles of negligence normally provide sufficient 
flexibility to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between claimant and defendant 
public authority that takes proper account of the latter’s responsibilities to act in the public 
interest’. 
61 Bailey and Bowman, above n 60, 116–7.  
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remedy sought is typically damages.62 The standards of behaviour expected, 
and the circumstances in which an ‘actionable wrong’ might be found, 
differ.63 A further consequence of doing so would be that principles applied to 
cases of negligence with respect to public authorities would differ from those 
applied to other defendants. This offends the rule of law, in the sense that the 
law should be applied equally.64 Alternatively, the legitimacy of a state’s legal 
demands on its citizens may be questioned if the state is subject to different 
rules from those to which its citizens are subject.65 Attempts by courts to 
identify ‘public functions’, to which arguably special rules might be applied, 
have been abandoned due to the inherent difficulty of doing so.66 Specifically 
negligence law has abandoned a category-based approach67 in favour of a 
broad, generalised duty of care.68 Categories are, however, still often useful. 
In the context of the application of a salient features approach, for example, 
the relative emphasis given to particular features will differ according to the 
category of case involved. The general trend of harmonisation of principle 
62 Cornford, above n 57, 17; Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 
CLR 1, 35 (McHugh J): ‘I am unable to accept that determination of a duty of care should 
depend on public law concepts. Public law concepts of duty and private law notions of duty 
are informed by differing rationales’. See also John Doyle, ‘Tort Liability for the Exercise of 
Statutory Powers’ in Paul Finn ed, Essays on Torts (Law book, 1989) 235–6: ‘there is no 
reason why a valid decision cannot be subject to a duty of care, and no reason why an invalid 
decision should more readily attract a duty of care’.  
63 Peter Cane, ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) 9(3) Otago Law Review 489, 507: ‘this sense of 
unreasonable (so-called Wednesbury unreasonableness, a public law doctrine) is stronger than 
that normally used in the law of tort’; John Doyle and Jonathon Redwood, ‘The Common 
Law Liability of Public Authorities: The Interface Between Public and Private Law’ (1999) 7 
Tort Law Review 30, 36: ‘the courts use the ultra vires test in judicial review, where the courts 
are concerned with the lawfulness of executive action. By contrast, common law proceedings 
for negligence germinate from an unrelated doctrinal base’; Roderick Bagshaw, ‘Monetary 
Remedies in Public Law — Misdiagnosis and Misprescription’ (2006) 26(1) Legal Studies 4, 
18–22. 
64 Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan and Co, 
1885) 110–114; Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67, 
73. 
65 Cornford states that in framing rules with respect to state liability in negligence, the principle 
that citizens must perceive the state’s power over them as legitimate is important: Cornford, 
above n 57, 11–13. 
66 Coomber (Surveyor of Taxes) v Berkshire Justices (1883) 9 App Cas 61. 
67 Heaven v Pender (1882–83) LR 11 QBD 503. 
68 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 
162 CLR 479 (abandonment of category approach to establishing a duty of care with respect 
to occupiers), Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 
(abandonment of special strict liability rules, subsumption into generalised duty of care). 
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seems inconsistent with immunities,69 special rules or presumptions applying 
where public authorities are sued in negligence.  
Courts have noted that generally one person (A) is not legally responsible to 
another (B) for failing to prevent a third party (C) from injuring B. McKenna 
conforms to that pattern, where the mental health authority is A, the mental 
health patient Pettigrove is C, and the family of Rose is B. There are, 
however, occasional exceptions. These may be based on arguments that A 
controlled C,70 or that ‘the act of (C) could not have taken place but for’ the 
breach of A’s duty.71 While an occupier of premises is held not liable in 
negligence for criminal acts committed on the premises, an exception to the 
general rule has been held to apply where the occupier has had specific 
knowledge of threats or danger.72 The principle that the defendant had 
assumed responsibility might also apply in McKenna, given that the defendant 
had Pettigrove under its control (in involuntary detention) for at least some 
time.73  
The questions of: the extent to which a body given statutory responsibilities 
owes a duty of care with respect to its exercise or non-exercise of those 
responsibilities, and of the party to whom it owes any duty of care, are ones 
that have been considered in previous cases. It is instructive to note how 
judgments in those cases dealt with these issues In particular, questions 
concerning the possible inconsistency of obligations between a posited 
common law duty of care and statutory provisions, and concerning the policy 
considerations guiding judicial interpretation in this area, will be the focus of 
this article.  
An earlier case that is relevant to the issues raised in McKenna is Sullivan v 
Moody.74 That case concerned child welfare legislation which, inter alia, 
enabled a government department to act in relation to child welfare. The 
overriding concern guiding the exercise of its powers was the welfare of the 
child. The legislation included a power to investigate claims of child abuse. It 
69 The word ‘immunities’ was used in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire) [1989] 1 AC 
53, 64 (Lord Keith). Subsequent UK cases have preferred different language given arguments 
that ‘immunity’ would be contrary to the ECHR: Osman v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 
101.  
70 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004. 
71 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 262 (Dixon J). 
72 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 267 (Gleeson CJ), 
270 (Gaudron J), 294 (Hayne J). 
73 While not unknown to Australian law, it is conceded that this principle is typically found 
more often in United Kingdom than in Australian cases. 
74 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
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stated that where a child welfare worker acted in good faith and in accordance 
with the section, that worker had no legal liability for any aspect of the 
investigation, and that any liability that would otherwise accrue would lie 
against the Crown. At issue were various reports made by workers and 
suggesting that some fathers had abused their children, conclusions that were 
later shown to be false. Those fathers who had been falsely accused brought 
defamation actions against the child welfare workers who compiled the 
reports, and the State. The High Court dismissed the claim, on the basis that 
no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs; since the 
imposition of such a duty would be inconsistent with and/or cut across the 
responsibilities of the State under the Act concerning child welfare.  
The Court held that the fact that a defendant owed a duty of care to a third 
party, or was subject to statutory obligations constraining the manner in which 
powers or discretions might be exercised, did not of itself rule out the 
possibility that it might owe a duty of care to a plaintiff. Individuals could be 
subject to a number of duties, provided that they were not irreconcilable.75 
The Court noted, for example, that medical practitioners reporting on the 
condition of an individual might owe duties to more than one person. 
However, problems would arise when a suggested duty would give rise to 
inconsistent obligations; in that case the posited duty would be denied. The 
Court found that where public authorities were charged with conducting 
investigations or exercising powers in the public interest or in the interests of 
a specified class of persons, the law would not ordinarily subject them to a 
duty to have regard to the interests of another class of persons where this 
would impose on them conflicting claims or obligations.76 Here a conflict 
would have arisen between the functions carried out by the child welfare 
authority, including investigating and reporting on possible child abuse, and a 
duty of care to those accused of that very thing.77 
In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,78 consumers who had suffered ill-
health after eating contaminated oysters alleged negligence against the local 
authority and state government with responsibilities over the waters from 
which the oysters had been harvested. The Court dismissed the claim. In so 
doing, it made several observations of significance to the discussion in 
75 See also Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 77 (Kirby 
J), 102–3 (Hayne J). 
76 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562,582 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). The Court also expressed concern with possible indeterminate liability (582) and 
noted that the plaintiffs might have remedies under the existing law of defamation (581). 
77 Ibid 582.  
78 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
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McKenna. McHugh J acknowledged that the mere fact that a public authority 
was conferred with powers the exercise of which could prevent harm to others 
did not mean that the authority owed a duty of care. However McHugh J then 
cited situations where such an authority would ordinarily owe a duty of care. 
These were where (a) the authority has used its powers to intervene in a field 
of activity and thereby increased the risk of harm to persons; or (b) it knew or 
ought to have known that a member of the public relies on it to exercise a 
power to protect that person’s interests.79 While the first requirement is not 
satisfied in the instant McKenna case, the second is. 
McHugh J further identified several matters to be considered in relation to 
whether a statutory authority owes a duty of care. It is necessary to ask 
whether: 
a reasonable public authority would reasonably foresee that its act or 
omission, including a failure to exercise its statutory powers, might 
result in injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s interests; 
the authority was in a position of control and whether it had any 
power to control the situation that brought about the harm to the 
injured person ; 
either the injured person or their interests were vulnerable in the sense 
that the injured person could not reasonably be expected to adequately 
safeguard him- or herself from harm;  
the public authority knew, or ought it to have known, of an existing 
risk of harm to the plaintiff or a specified class of persons including 
the plaintiff;  
the imposition of the duty of care on the authority would make it 
liable with respect to the defendant’s exercise of core policy-making 
or quasi-legislative functions.80  
In McKenna all questions except the last can be answered affirmatively. 
Gummow and Hayne JJ also alluded to the relevance of the degree and nature 
of control exercised by the authority over the harm that eventuated, the degree 
of vulnerability of those depending on the proper exercise by the authority of 
the powers, and whether the suggested duty was consistent with the terms, 
79 Ibid 576. 
80 Ibid 577. 
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scope and purpose of the relevant statute.81 In denying that a duty existed in 
the Graham Barclay Oysters case, Gummow and Hayne JJ took into account 
that the state was not aware of any particular contamination risk, and there 
had been no prior outbreaks.82 
The High Court also considered the liability of public authorities in Brodie v 
Singleton Shire Council.83 There, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ noted 
that the statutory powers given to public authorities may give it such a 
significant and special measure of control over safety and property as to 
impose a duty of care. The duty might entail seeking to minimise a danger to 
safety or to warn of the danger, but control was a paramount issue.84 The duty 
of care was owed to a class of persons, identified as users of roads within the 
local authority’s control.85 The joint reasons noted that ‘the formulation of the 
duty of care includes consideration of competing or conflicting 
responsibilities of the authority’.86 It should be noted that the existence of 
competing or conflicting responsibilities did not negate a duty of care; rather, 
such facts would help shape, and confine, the posited duty of care. 
In Pyrenees Shire Council v Day87 the court found no conflict between the 
Council’s responsibilities under the Local Government Act 1958 (Vic), and a 
common law duty to those living in the immediate area of the relevant 
premises. The Council had exercised its statutory power to inspect a fireplace, 
and had deemed the fireplace in the premises to be unsafe. It wrote to the 
occupying tenant to that effect, warning that the fireplace should not be used 
until repairs were made. The tenant did not pass the letter on to the owner, or 
inform the owner of the contents. The Council did not follow the matter up to 
ensure that the necessary repairs had been made. New tenants subsequently 
moved in and two years later the premises and adjoining premises were 
destroyed by a fire caused by the defects in the fireplace. 
81 Ibid 597–8; to like effect Kirby J (617); Callinan J spoke of ‘vulnerability, power, control, 
generality or particularity of the class, resources of and demands upon the authority’ (664); 
Gleeson CJ stated that a general legislative power to protect the public did not ordinarily give 
rise to a duty of care to a particular individual or members of a particular class (562). 
82 Ibid 607. 
83 (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
84 Ibid 559. 
85 Ibid 577. 
86 Ibid 580–1. 
87 (1998) 192 CLR 330. 
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At least one of the reasons why the Council had been given power with 
respect to fireplaces was to reduce the risk of harm to nearby residents.88 The 
plaintiff (one of the neighbours) was within a class of claimants within the 
contemplation of the legislation.89 The risk involved in not complying with 
the inspector’s directions was extreme.90 Neighbours were vulnerable and 
relied on the Council to exercise its powers appropriately and protect them 
from harm.91 
Earlier, in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman,92 Gibbs CJ stated that 
ordinary principles of the law of negligence should apply to public authorities, 
and that they could be liable, if they exercised a power negligently, to 
someone who relied on what the public authority did and could show injury 
suffered as a result of the negligence.93 Mason J agreed that a public authority 
could owe a duty of care to others, expressing this principle in terms of that 
authority ‘creating a danger’.94 In that context the authority could owe a duty 
of care to preserve the safety of others. Alternatively the negligence of public 
authorities could be based on the reliance of the injured party on the exercise 
of the duty of care.95 
The possible application of the principles derived from these cases to the facts 
at issue in the recent McKenna decision will be considered later in this article. 
A Non-High Court Decisions 
1 United Kingdom 
A case with equivalent facts to those of the McKenna decision is Home Office 
v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd.96 There young detainees in an institution for at-risk 
youth escaped from an island. The detainees had criminal records, and had 
88 Ibid 342 (Brennan CJ). 
89 Ibid 347 (Brennan CJ). 
90 Ibid 348 (Brennan CJ). 
91 Ibid 359 (Toohey J), 370 (McHugh J). 
92 (1985) 157 CLR 424. 
93 Ibid 445; to like effect Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 
1, 29 (McHugh J regarded as a ‘settled category’ ‘that when statutory powers are conferred 
they must be exercised with reasonable care, so that if those who exercise them could by 
reasonable precaution have prevented an injury which has been occasioned, and was likely to 
be occasioned, by their exercise, damages for negligence may be recovered’. 
94 Ibid 460. 
95 Ibid 461, 464. 
96 [1970] AC 1004. 
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escaped from institutions in the past. They were not properly restrained or 
supervised by relevant officers. There was a deliberate government policy of 
giving those detained as much freedom and responsibility as possible, with a 
view to developing trust and responsible decision making. In the course of 
their escape, a boat ‘borrowed’ by the detainees collided with a yacht owed by 
the plaintiff, and then boarded it, causing further damage to it. The owner of 
the yacht sued the administrator of the institution in negligence. Four of five 
members of the House of Lords dismissed an appeal against a finding that the 
Home Office owed a duty of care to the yacht owner. 
Lord Reid stated that there was good authority to support an action against a 
public authority that had exercised a statutory duty negligently.97 He 
distinguished cases involving an exercise of discretion, but found that, if the 
discretion was exercised carelessly or unreasonably, an action might still lie. 
He acknowledged that the Home Office had conflicting considerations with 
which to contend — the public interest in protecting neighbours and their 
property from escapees, as opposed to the public interest in promoting 
rehabilitation.98 It had pursued a policy of maximising detainees’ freedom 
with rehabilitation in mind. This was reflected in statutory rules.99 
Importantly, the fact that these conflicting considerations existed did not lead 
Lord Reid to a finding that to impose a duty of care on the Home Office with 
respect to an owner of a yacht nearby would be inconsistent with their duties 
to detainees. Similarly Lord Morris acknowledged that officers had duties of 
care to their employers. This did not obviate a duty of care to detainees; rather 
he held that the common law duty of care to detainees would be ‘conditioned 
by’ the other duties.100 Lord Morris emphasised the control that the officers 
had over those detained, in establishing that a duty of care towards the 
detainees existed.101 Lord Pearson took a similar view. After acknowledging 
the Home Office’s deliberate policy of light supervision of, and freedom for, 
those detained in youth detention facilities, his Lordship continued: 
it would affect only the content or standard and not the existence of the duty 
of care. It may be that when the method is being intensively employed there 
is not very much that the Defendants’ officers can do for the protection of 
97 Ibid 1031.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Borstal (No 2) Rules, 1949, r 25 referred to every inmate being able ‘to develop his 
individuality on right lines and with a proper sense of personal responsibility. Officers shall 
therefore, while firmly maintaining discipline and order, seek to do so by influencing the 
inmates by their own example and leadership and by enlisting their willing co-operation’. 
100 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, 1036. 
101 Ibid 1039. 
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the neighbours and their property. But it does not follow that they have no 
duty to do anything at all for this purpose. They should exercise such care 
for the protection of the neighbours and their property as is consistent with 
the due carrying out of the Borstal system of training.102 
Lord Diplock referred to the reconciliation of competing interests in accepting 
the existence of a duty of care in the case.103 This balance of competing 
interests is also a theme in the Court of Appeal decision in W v Egdell,104 
where Bingham LJ discussed the balance between a mental health patient’s 
legitimate desire to regain freedom, and the public’s legitimate desire to be 
protected from violence. President Brown (as he then was) discussed 
exceptions to the general rule in favour of patient confidentiality, finding that 
an exception was justified in the interests of public safety.105 A claim such as 
this is less likely to be successful when the victim is not identified or 
identifiable as a member of a specific class.106 
More common have been claims against police authorities. These cases 
present facts analogous to those in McKenna to the extent that they involve 
questions about the exercise, or non-exercise, of statutory functions in the 
context of a victim complaining of injuries suffered as a result of the manner 
102 Ibid 1056. 
103 Ibid 1068–9: ‘this … is the way in which the courts should set about the task of reconciling 
the public interest in maintaining the freedom of the Home Office to decide upon the system 
of custody and control of Borstal trainees which is most likely to conduct to their reformation 
and the prevention of crime and the public interest that Borstal officers should not be allowed 
to be completely disregardful of the interests both of the trainees in their charge and of 
persons likely to be injured by their carelessness without the law providing redress to those 
who in fact sustain injury’. It should be acknowledged that Lord Diplock stated in dicta that a 
decision to deliberately release a detainee which led to injury to a plaintiff would not lead to 
liability on the part of the Home Office, unless the decision was a wholly unreasonable one 
(1068). The House of Lords would later abandon the ‘wholly unreasonable’ test for 
establishing whether or not a public authority was liable in negligence: X (Minors) v 
Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 736 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, for the 
House). 
104 [1990] 1 Ch 359. 
105 See also Jones v Smith [1999] 1 SCR 455 (where a solicitor-client privilege was waived — 
with respect to a psychiatric report which suggested that a particular person was likely to 
kidnap, rape and murder prostitutes in future — due to an overriding public safety interest in 
that waiver). 
106 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [2000] PNLR 87 (Stuart-Smith, Pill, Thorpe LJJ). (In this 
case a person had come to the attention of the Authority as someone suffering from a 
personality disorder and psychopathic personality. The person, who had been detained for a 
period in the hospital but had been released, had some history of violence and had suffered 
sexual abuse as a child. He subsequently raped and murdered a four year old girl. The girl’s 
mother’s claim for psychiatric injury was rejected as disclosing no cause of action, because 
the plaintiff was not a member of an identified or identifiable class). 
                                                 
2015 THE LIABILITY OF PROVIDERS OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN NEGLIGENCE 243 
in which those functions were carried out. There is evident reluctance to find 
police authorities liable in negligence for failing to prevent crime being 
committed, even where the victim had brought the specific danger to the 
attention of police.107 In these cases, the courts have established a general rule 
that police do not owe a duty of care to victims of crime to prevent crime from 
occurring. This is subject to exceptions, including where there is control — 
for instance over the person who causes injuries to another — or an 
assumption of responsibility — for example in relation to a person, or, 
perhaps, a situation. A duty of care has been found to be owed by the police 
where a person was detained involuntarily in police custody.108 More 
commonly, claims against police in negligence have been dismissed.109  
Despite this, the cases are of some use here. Their reasoning is at some points 
similar to the reasoning that led the High Court to deny that a duty of care was 
owed in McKenna. The similarity lies in the focus on the practical difficulties 
caused by the imposition of a duty of care on the relevant decision maker. For 
instance, a duty of care would encourage the decision maker to adopt a 
‘detrimentally defensive frame of mind’110 and would have financial 
implications for the government111 which would need to defend such actions 
and also take pro-active measures to minimise the risk of liability. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the courts are not equipped to effectively 
second-guess police decisions regarding lines of enquiry.112 These arguments 
will be further considered below. Further, in the recent case of Michael v 
Chief Constable of South Wales Police,113 the two dissenting justices made 
statements supportive of the position taken in this article: 
the time has come to recognise the legal duty of the police force to take 
action to protect a particular individual whose life or safety is, to the 
knowledge of the police, threatened by someone whose actions the police 
are able to restrain.114 
107 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 WLR 343. 
108 Kirkham v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283, 289. .  
109 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 WLR 343, and the cases cited 
therein. 
110 Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2008] 3 WLR 593, 624 [89] (Lord 
Phillips), 632–3 [132] (Lord Brown). 
111 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 WLR 343, 371 [122] (Lord 
Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed). 
112 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53. 
113 [2015] 2 WLR 343. 
114 Ibid 385 [175] (Lord Kerr), with whom Lady Hale expressed agreement: 390–1 [197]. 
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2 United States 
The Supreme Court of California considered analogous questions in Vitaly 
Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California.115 There Prosenjit Poddar 
apparently told a University psychologist of his plans to kill the victim, 
Tatiana Tarasoff, who had spurned his advances. Police briefly detained 
Poddar, but he was then released. No one informed the victim, or her family, 
of the threat. Two months later, Poddar killed the victim. Her family brought 
action in negligence against the employer of the psychologist and the police 
for failure to protect and failure to warn Tarasoff. In a landmark decision the 
Supreme Court found that a claim against the psychologist should proceed. 
The Court expressly held that the legal responsibilities of the psychologist 
were not confined to the immediate patient, but extended at least to those 
whom the psychologist knew were threatened by the patient.116 The Court 
considered and rejected claims that to impose a duty of care on the 
psychologist to others would be inconsistent with the duty of care, including a 
duty of confidentiality, that the psychologist owed to the patient, and that free 
and open communication was essential to the practice of psychology, 
something which recognition of a duty of care to third parties would inhibit. 
The Court responded that this interest had to be weighed against the public 
interest in safety from violence,117 concluding that ‘the protective privilege 
ends where the public peril begins’.118 
In Lipari v Sears, Roebuck & Co,119 the offender had been involuntarily 
detained in a mental hospital run by the Veterans Administration, a United 
States agency. He was released and placed on a voluntary treatment program, 
which he subsequently discontinued. A month later he shot and killed one 
person and seriously injured another. The Court found that the United States 
agency owed a duty of care to third parties in relation to the offender. The 
Nebraskan Court specifically rejected the argument accepted by the High 
Court in McKenna: 
A second policy argument raised by the United States involves the goal of 
placing mental patients in the least restrictive environment. The United 
States contends that imposing liability on a psychotherapist would conflict 
with this goal because therapists would attempt to protect themselves from 
liability by placing their patients in a restrictive environment. This argument 
115 551 P 2d 334 (Cal, 1976). 
116 Ibid 344. 
117 Ibid 346. 
118 Ibid 347. 
119 497 F Supp 185 (D Neb, 1980). 
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misinterprets the nature of the duty imposed upon the therapist. The 
recognition of this duty does not make the psychotherapist liable for any 
harm caused by his patient, but rather makes him liable only when his 
negligent treatment of the patient caused the injury in question … despite 
the defendant’s protests to the contrary, a psychotherapist is not subject to 
liability for placing his patient in a less restrictive environment, so long as 
he uses due care in assessing the risks of such a placement.120 
Other American courts have noted the potential for conflict between goals of 
rehabilitation and treatment on the one hand, and public safety on the other. 
Notably, this has not led to a denial that those in charge of mental health 
facilities, prisons, and other public facilities and institutions, owe or may owe 
a duty of care to members of the general public. It might, however, mean that 
a duty of care (in the sense of a duty to warn, rather than a duty to protect) is 
more likely to be recognised where the specific dangerousness of the person 
released sets this person apart from the typical detainee.121 Further, liability 
might be limited to members of an identifiable class, if such is possible, rather 
than to the general public. A family member of the person attacked has been 
recognised as belonging to an identifiable class.122 Some courts have 
permitted claims although no class narrower than the general public is readily 
identifiable.123 
The Supreme Court of Ohio decision of Estates of Morgan v Fairfield Family 
Counselling Center124 involved facts similar to those of McKenna. Morgan 
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and psychosis. He was being treated 
by the defendant with psychotherapy and counselling, and had been for 
several months. He began not taking his medication, and his parents noticed 
that his behaviour was deteriorating, evidenced by increasing verbal abuse, 
apparent conversations with someone who was not there, and complaints of 
physical assaults and pain that were not real. Morgan was assessed twice with 
a view to involuntary detention, and on both occasions it was determined that 
120 Ibid 188–93; adopted and applied in Durflinger v Artiles 727 F 2d 888, 901–6 (10th Cir, 
1984). 
121 Rollins v Petersen 813 P 2d 1156, 1161 (Utah, 1991): ‘The sensible approach is to recognize 
a duty on the part of the custodian that does not discourage the operation of transitional 
programs, but requires the custodian to use special care when the one in custody sets him- or 
herself apart ... in terms of dangerousness to an identifiable person or persons’.  
122 Hedlund v The Superior Court of Orange County 669 P 2d 41 (Cal, 1983) (a case of a son 
who suffered a psychiatric injury after a patient being treated by psychologists shot his mother 
in the presence of the son). 
123 Estate of Johnson by Johnson v Village of Libertyville 496 NE 2d 1219, 1223 (Ill App 2 
Dist, 1986). 
124 673 NE 2d 1311 (Ohio, 1997). 
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he did not fit the criteria. Six weeks after the last assessment, he shot and 
killed his parents and injured his sister. 
The Supreme Court accepted that the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiffs. It reasoned that many cases involved the striking of a balance 
between countervailing public interests, including a patient’s interest in being 
placed in the least restrictive environment possible and in not being 
involuntarily detained.125 The Court admitted to 
some trepidation concerning the imposition of a duty because of the fear 
that therapists will attempt to protect themselves from liability by 
involuntarily hospitalizing nonviolent mental patients… This fear, however, 
has no reliable statistical support.126 … Instead, the statistical evidence that 
is available indicates that Tarasoff has not discouraged therapists from 
treating dangerous patients, nor has it led to an increased use of involuntary 
commitment of patients perceived as dangerous.127 
This reasoning partly answers concerns raised in the police liability context in 
the United Kingdom regarding whether recognition of a duty of care would 
cause the decision maker to adopt a ‘detrimentally defensive’ frame of mind, 
as assumed by the House of Lords in Hill. The research cited in the passage 
above casts doubt on the extent to which recognition of a duty of care by the 
125 Ibid 1321. 
126 The judges cited Daniel J Givelber, William J Bowers and Carolyn L Blitch, ‘Tarasoff, 
Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action’ [1984] Wisconsin Law 
Review 443, 486. A similar result is found in Paul S Appelbaum, ‘The New Preventive 
Detention: Psychiatry’s Problematic Responsibility for the Control of Violence’ (1988) 145 
American Journal of Psychiatry 779. Fox concluded that the effects of a duty to warn on the 
psychotherapist-client relationship had been minimal: Patrick Fox, ‘Commentary: So the 
Pendulum Swings — Making Sense of the Duty to Protect’ (2010) 38(4) Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 474, 475, as did Mossman, ‘Critique of Pure 
Risk Assessment Or, Kant Meets Tarasoff’ (2006) 75 University of Cincinnati Law Review 
523, 526: ‘Psychotherapists accept the fact that, while they may regard themselves as the 
caregivers of individual patients, they sometimes must function as agents for social 
protection’ and as did Renée L Binder and Dale E McNiel, ‘Application of the Tarasoff 
Ruling and its Effect on the Victim and the Therapeutic Relationship’ (1996) 47(11) 
Psychiatric Services 1212. Wise commented on the positive social effects of the Tarasoff 
decision: ‘to the extent that Tarasoff has encouraged therapists to probe more fully into 
potential violence and to consult with colleagues when they confront it, the decision may be a 
boon to the proper identification of the dangerous patient’: Toni Wise, ‘Where the Public Peril 
Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff’ (1978) 31(1) 
Stanford Law Review 165, 186. 
127 Estates of Morgan v Fairfield Family Counselling Center 673 NE 2d 1311, 1325 (Ohio, 
1997). 
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mental health professional in cases such as McKenna would lead to the kind 
of change in behaviour feared by some justices.128 
Fears that the Tarasoff decision would lead to an unsustainable increase in 
successful claims against mental health professionals for breaching the duty of 
care have similarly not been supported by empirical evidence. A study of 
more than 100 claims at appellate level against mental health professionals for 
failure to protect or failure to warn concluded that  
defendants are now rarely held to be negligent on grounds of failing to warn 
or protect. In reviewing 21 years of legal history, we found just four cases in 
which psychotherapists were found liable for breach of a Tarasoff duty.129 
Fears that the recognition of a duty of care to third parties was inconsistent 
with the mental health professional’s duty of care to the patient were also 
negated by comments such as the following from a practising psychiatrist and 
scholar that ‘I can scarcely conceive of a psychiatric interview in which the 
patient’s risk to self or others is not addressed’.130 An empirical study among 
mental health professionals found that ‘a duty to protect potential victims is 
not viewed as ethically repugnant’.131 
While the general words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts132 had been 
interpreted consistently with the Tarasoff decision to impose a duty on the 
mental health professional, the Restatement (3rd) of Torts is even more 
explicit. Section 41(b)(4) specifically recognises a duty of a mental health 
128 Peterson has concluded that concerns about defensive decision making in the current context 
‘show a concerning scepticism about the integrity of medical decision-making’: Kathryn 
Peterson, ‘Where is the Line to be Drawn? Medical Negligence and Insanity in Hunter Area 
Health Service v Presland’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 181, 187. 
129 Matthew Soulier, Andrea Maislen and James Beck, ‘Status of the Psychiatric Duty to 
Protect, Circa 2006’ (2010) 38(4) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law 457, 469. 
130 Fox, above n 126, 475. 
131 Givelber, Bowers and Blitch, above n 126, 486, and ‘our respondents only endorsed the 
broader principle that a therapist has ethical responsibilities to protect potential victims … the 
data certainly contradict the assertion that therapists must only concern themselves with the 
welfare of their patients and not with that of society at large’ (476). Recently Hafemeister, 
McLaughlin and Smith stated that it was now widely acknowledged that the effect of the 
Tarasoff ruling had not been ‘ruinous’ to clinical practice: Thomas Hafemeister, Leah 
McLaughlin and Jessica Smith, ‘Parity at a Price: The Emerging Professional Liability of 
Mental Health Providers’ (2013) 50(1) San Diego Law Review 29, 79. 
132 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).  
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professional to third parties who might be harmed by the actions of their 
patient.133  
In summary, the American decisions demonstrate that the release of a person 
from care is not inconsistent with obligations owed by mental health 
professionals to recognise that they might owe a duty of care to those placed 
at risk by a decision. This has not caused major disruption to the way in which 
mental health professionals do their work. Release of a person from care was 
not, and is not, inconsistent with their practice, and does not raise serious 
ethical issues. Further, the ‘sky has not fallen in’ in the sense that no 
unmanageable number of claims, or successful claims, have been made 
against mental health professionals for the release of detainees. While there is 
no suggestion that American law should provide the basis for the law in 
Australia, these cases are relevant to any assessment of the reasoning utilised 
by the High Court to deny that a duty of care existed in McKenna. They do 
not provide support for an argument that the recognition of a duty of care in 
the field of mental health care would create inconsistency of obligations, or 
open a floodgate to litigation.  
Further, the equivalent134 English authorities have been even more prepared 
than their US counterparts to find that a duty of care exists where there has 
been an assumption of responsibility, and control. Specifically, despite 
general reluctance to find that police owe a duty of care, such a duty has been 
established where police have involuntarily detained an individual, and 
detained that person in police custody. The grounds for this finding are the 
police’s control over, and assumption of responsibility for, that individual. 
IV WHY THE HIGH COURT WAS WRONG TO DENY THAT A 
DUTY OF CARE EXISTED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Having considered past Australian and overseas precedent on the question of 
duties of care owed by public authorities in relevant contexts, in the final part 
of this article the reasoning utilised by the High Court to deny a duty of care 
in McKenna will be considered. It is the present author’s view that the High 
133American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm (2010). It should be acknowledged that some states have moved to regulate by statute 
the liability of mental health professionals. See for discussion Michael Geske, ‘Statutes 
Limiting Mental Health Professionals’ Liability for the Violent Acts of Their Patients’ (1999) 
64(2) Indiana Law Journal 391. 
134 They are equivalent in the sense that the power of involuntary detention was utilised. 
Suspected criminals are not being equated to those suffering from mental illness. 
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Court was wrong to deny that a mental health authority could, or did, owe a 
duty of care to family members of a person killed by someone whom the 
mental health authority had just released. This denial was largely due to the 
Court’s finding of an inconsistency or incompatibility between the duty said 
to arise, and other provisions of the mental health legislation at the relevant 
time. Most particularly the Court took into account the prevailing clear policy 
that involuntary detention was to be a last resort, and that treatment should be 
minimally invasive of the patient’s dignity and human rights. The errors of the 
High Court’s view will now be explained.  Issues that, although relevant to 
the resolution of the dispute, did not form part of the High Court’s reasoning 
in the case, will not be considered.135  
A The Act  
Authorities such as Sullivan v Moody and Pyrenees Shire Council v Day 
indicate that the object, scope and terms of the relevant statute are important 
considerations in deciding whether a statutory authority owes a common law 
duty of care to others with respect to the exercise of its powers.136 
It is true, as the High Court pointed out in McKenna, that sections of the 
Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW)137 clearly focused on the treatment of 
individuals suffering from mental illness. They demonstrated appropriate 
sensitivity to the impact that involuntary detention and treatment might have 
on individuals by requiring that the least invasive means of treatment be 
used.138 However, this discussion by the High Court was highly selective. The 
Court did not discuss section 21 which allowed a medical practitioner or 
authorised person to detain a person based on an opinion that the person was 
suffering from a mental illness or disorder. Chapter 3 of the legislation was 
entitled ‘Mentally Ill and Mentally Disordered Persons’. Section 8, in that 
chapter, stated that for the purposes of assessing whether a person should be 
involuntarily detained under the Act, a person was mentally ill or disordered 
only if the person met the criteria set out in that Chapter. Relevantly, section 9 
stated that a person was mentally ill if the person was suffering from a mental 
illness and, owing to that illness, there were reasonable grounds for believing 
that care, treatment and control of the person was necessary:  
135 These include, for example, the fact that it was a claim for psychiatric injury, the question of 
whether any posited duty of care was breached, and the question of causation. 
136 For example, Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 563 (Gleeson 
CJ), 574 (McHugh J), 597–8 (Gummow and Hayne JJ) (with whom Gaudron J agreed (570)), 
617 (Kirby J), 658–9 (Callinan J). 
137 Now repealed. 
138 For instance, Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) ss 4, 20, 28, 29, 35. 
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(i) for the person’s own protection from serious harm; or 
(ii) for the protection of others from harm (emphasis added). 
Section 10 stated that a person was a mentally disordered person if the 
person’s behaviour at a given time was so irrational as to justify a conclusion 
on reasonable grounds that temporary care, treatment or control of the person 
was necessary: 
(i) for the person’s own protection from serious harm; or 
(ii) for the protection of others from harm (emphasis added).139  
Thus, of the two criteria that a medical practitioner was to consider in 
assessing whether a person was suffering from a mental illness or mental 
disorder (concepts relevant to whether a person is to be involuntarily 
detained), one of them required the decision maker to have regard to whether 
care, treatment and control of the person was necessary to protect others from 
harm. 
Given this fact, it is very difficult to fathom, or accept, the (relatively terse) 
finding of the High Court in McKenna140 that to accept that decision makers 
in such cases have a duty of care to possible victims of a person they might 
release would be inconsistent with the mental health legislation under which 
the decision to detain or release is made.141 With respect, how can it be 
inconsistent when the Act itself expressly contemplates — indeed requires — 
that the decision maker will take into account the risk to others in assessing 
139 Sections 14 and 15 of the (current) Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) are in materially similar 
form, again including ‘protection of others from harm’ as one of the two criteria to be 
considered. This mirrors mental health legislation elsewhere: see Mental Health Act 2014 
(Vic) s 29(b)(ii); Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s 13(1)(d)(i); Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) s 
21(1)(b); Mental Health Act 2006 (WA) s 26(1)(b)(i); Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s 
17(1)(c); Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) s 26(p)(ii); Mental Health and 
Related Services Act 1998 (NT) s 14(A). 
140 The Court explained its findings regarding inconsistent duties in five paragraphs: (2014) 253 
CLR 270, 281–2, [29]–[33]. 
141 In this sense, the case is more akin to the finding in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 
192 CLR 330 that although the Council owed obligations to a range of individuals, the 
obligation to a particular home owner complemented, and was not mutually exclusive of, 
obligations to owners of neighbouring properties, because the overriding obligation was 
public safety. The same can be said in this case. Therefore Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 
562 can be distinguished because in that instance there really could be a conflict between a 
duty to thoroughly investigate claims of child abuse, guided by the best interests of the child, 
and the right of a person under investigation to his or her reputation.  
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whether a person is mentally ill or mentally disordered, concepts directly 
linked to questions of involuntary detention?142 
It is also worth recalling Hunter Area Health Service v Presland,143 
coincidentally a very similar case of negligence brought against a mental 
health service in that region. There the plaintiff had been taken by police to a 
hospital following ‘bizarre and violent’ behaviour involving telling a person 
‘he didn’t think he could kill him’, hitting a victim with a fence paling, 
grabbing others (including a three year old child) by the throat, jumping up 
into the air, and claiming that the ‘rats must die’. He was then transferred to a 
public psychiatric hospital for assessment. That hospital released him on the 
same day, in the company of his brother. Six hours later the plaintiff killed his 
brother’s fiancé. He was acquitted of a charge of murder on the basis of 
mental illness, and was committed to a psychiatric institution. When released, 
he sued the mental health authority, arguing that it was negligent in releasing 
him so soon on the first occasion. He claimed that, if the authority had not 
done so, he would not have killed the victim and been subsequently 
involuntarily detained, which he claimed caused him emotional distress. 
A majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s 
negligence claim. Notwithstanding this, comments made in the judgment are 
highly relevant here. Spigelman CJ, dissenting in the result, noted the 
existence of sections 9 and 10 of the …, including the reference to protection 
of others from harm. He considered this an important criterion to be used in 
determining the need for detention. His Honour noted: 
If this were proceedings by a third party who had suffered harm at the hands 
of a mentally ill or disordered person, then it would fall within the intended 
sphere of protection to which the statutory provisions expressly relate.144 
(emphasis added) 
142 To reiterate, the purpose of determining whether a person is suffering from a mental illness 
or mental disorder is to consider their involuntary detention, continued involuntary detention 
or community treatment order: Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) s 8. 
143 [2005] NSWCA 33. See for discussion Ian Freckelton, ‘Liability of Psychiatrists for Failure 
to Certify: Presland v Hunter Area Health Service and Dr Nazarian’ [2003] NSWSC 754’ 
(2003) 10(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 397; Kathryn Peterson, ‘Where is the Line to 
be Drawn? Medical Negligence and Insanity in Hunter Area Health Service v Presland’ 
(2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 181.  
144 Presland [2005] NSWCA 33 [29]. A leading scholar in the medico-legal field agrees: 
‘Properly construed … the criteria for involuntariness are not in conflict with the recognition 
of a duty to treat provided the criteria are satisfied’: Ian Freckelton, ‘Legal Liability for 
Psychiatrists’ Decisions about Involuntary Inpatient Status for Mental Health Patients’ (2014) 
22 Journal of Law and Medicine 280, 288.  
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These comments are dicta, but they fit the situation at issue in McKenna. If 
Spigelman CJ had been considering that case, he surely would have found the 
existence of a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, based on these comments.145 
His conclusion (based on the same provisions as those considered in 
McKenna) is diametrically opposed to the interpretation rendered by the High 
Court in that case. With respect, the view of Spigelman CJ is much to be 
preferred, based on the clear wording of the sections — sections 9 and 10 — 
to which the High Court did not refer in McKenna.  
Further, while Spigelman CJ was dissenting in Presland, one member of the 
majority, Santow JA, stated that, although he rejected this claim, he might 
have reached a different conclusion had the plaintiff been someone who 
suffered at the hand of a person negligently released from a mental health 
unit.146 This was in the context of his statement that any person or 
organisation claiming immunity from general principles of negligence 
liability, including statutory authorities, had to satisfy a ‘heavy burden of 
justification’,147 and his agreement with Spigelman CJ’s espousal of relevant 
principles in terms of liability in negligence of statutory authorities.148 This 
suggests to the author that, on facts such as those in McKenna, Santow JA is 
likely to have reached the same conclusion as Spigelman CJ did in dissent in 
Presland.   
Another decision, from South Australia, found that a parole authority owed a 
duty of care to the victims of a person whom it had released early upon 
conditions. The duty arose based on specific information proven to have been 
known to the authorities (presumably from public complaints) that the person 
released was in breach of his parole conditions, placing children at risk. The 
court did not conclude in that case that a duty of care to these victims was 
145 Spigelman CJ dismissed an argument that a finding that a duty of care was owed to those 
other than the patient would lead to the practice of defensive medicine: ‘The Court ought to 
be slow to conclude that a medical practitioner acting true to his or her profession, would 
permit the process of formulating a professional opinion be distorted by the prospect of civil 
liability’: Presland [2005] NSWCA 33 [37]. In contrast Sheller JA was concerned that this 
might occur: at [297]. 
146 ‘This is not the case of an action brought by a third party against a careless hospital who was 
physically injured during a psychotic episode at the hands of someone whose compulsory 
detention for treatment would have averted the injury to that person’: ibid [345]. Certainly, 
the fact that in Presland it was the wrongdoer who was the one claiming compensation was 
relevant to the court’s decision to reject the claim. 
147 Ibid [345]. 
148 Ibid [325]. 
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inconsistent with the parole board’s duties to rehabilitate offenders through 
the prudent use of early parole.149 
Similarly, the United Kingdom decision of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co 
Ltd and American decisions such as Tarasoff, raise questions about the extent 
to which duties of care to those detained involuntarily do irreconcilably 
conflict with duties to those who might be injured by someone being released 
from care. In Home Office, the Court clearly concluded that the recognition 
that authorities owed a duty of care to those who might be affected by escaped 
residents did not conflict with the policy of the facility to provide maximum 
freedom to residents and allow them to make decisions as much as possible. 
The American decisions, led by Tarasoff, tend to negate the suggestion of an 
impossible conflict between the duty owed by mental health professionals to 
their patients, including their duty to use minimally invasive treatment, and 
the duty of care owed to those who might be injured by the person released 
from involuntary detention. In fact, such duties have happily co-existed in the 
United States for some years. The evidence is that such co-existence has not 
proven to be impossible, has not really changed the way in which mental 
health practice has functioned, and is not inconsistent with the ethical 
obligations owed by such professionals. Rates of litigation against mental 
health professionals have not proven unmanageable. As always, there is no 
substitute for evidence-based decision making in preference to 
generalisations, or assumptions that recognising mental health professionals 
as owing a duty of care to members of the general public will lead to 
unmanageable litigation levels. 
B Criteria for Recognition of a Duty of Care Owed by 
Public Authorities 
In Crimmins McHugh J listed150 five factors to be considered in deciding 
whether a public authority owes a duty of care: 
(1) whether a reasonable public authority would reasonably foresee that 
its act or omission, including failure to exercise powers, might result 
in injury to the plaintiff; 
(2) whether the public authority was in a position of control;151 
149 Swan v State of South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 532 (Bollen J, with whom Mohr and 
Duggan JJ agreed).  
150 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39; Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577. 
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(3) whether the plaintiff/s were vulnerable in that they could not 
reasonably be expected to adequately protect themselves from 
harm;152 
(4) whether the public authority knew, or ought to have known, of an 
existing risk of harm to the plaintiff or of a class of persons of whom 
the plaintiff was one;153 and, 
(5) whether the imposition of the duty would impose liability with respect 
to the defendant’s core policy making or quasi-legislative functions. 
Each of these factors will now be applied to the facts in McKenna.154 
151 Control was also cited as a critical consideration, in the context of whether a statutory 
authority owed a duty of care, by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd 
v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 597 (with whom Gaudron J agreed (570)), Kirby J (630), 
Callinan J (664); and in Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 (Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ), 261 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (in the context of police officers with 
statutory powers). Control is important to duty of care issues more generally: Hill v Van Erp 
(1997) 188 CLR 159, 198 (Gaudron J), 212 (McHugh J), 234 (Gummow J); Perre v Apand 
Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 195 (Gleeson CJ), 201 (Gaudron J), 326 (Callinan J); Adeels 
Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 436–7 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ). As indicated above, the question of control or lack of it is also 
critical in decisions of the United Kingdom Supreme Court regarding whether a public 
authority owes a duty of care: Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 
WLR 343, 366 [99] (Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and 
Lord Hodge agreed). 
152 Vulnerability was also cited by Gummow and Hayne JJ as a critical consideration in the 
context of whether a statutory authority owed a duty of care: Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd 
v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 597 (Gaudron J (570)) and Callinan J (664) agreeing. See also 
Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) and 
260 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), a decision relating to police officers with statutory powers. 
Vulnerability is important to duty of care issues more generally: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 
CLR 159, 186 (Dawson J) (with whom Toohey J agreed (188)); Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 
198 CLR 180, 195 (Gleeson CJ), 201 (Gaudron J), 220, 225 (McHugh J), 259 (Gummow J). 
See also Jane Stapleton ‘The Golden Rule at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the 
Vulnerable’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 135.  
153 This is relevant in terms of floodgates arguments. For example, the United States courts 
have been more likely to recognise a claim where the plaintiffs were specifically known to the 
defendants as being individuals likely to be affected by the actions of the person released (for 
example, family members and loved ones), rather than strangers (see discussion at text 
associated with nn 85 and 86). 
154 The High Court did not consider these five issues in McKenna in determining whether a 
duty of care was owed. Macfarlan JA (with whom Beazley P agreed) considered and applied 
these factors in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: McKenna v Hunter and New England 
Local Health District [2014] NSWCA 476, [93]–[95].  
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Regarding the first factor, it is clearly foreseeable that a person with a 20 year 
history of mental illness and psychosis, who is suffering from hallucinations 
and is on little medication, might pose a danger to those around him or her. 
The hospital authorities were aware that Pettigrove was to be released into the 
care of his friend Rose, and were aware that the two would be sharing a 
vehicle for a journey of 1200 kilometres. The fact that doctors were conscious 
that this was risky is borne out by the fact that they made enquiries about the 
route that would be taken, and were satisfied that there were numerous mental 
health facilities along the way. (It remains unclear how this would be of 
assistance if the patient suffered an episode in a place and at a time where it 
was not possible to obtain the required assistance, something which tragically 
came to pass). Moreover, surely it was foreseeable that, if the patient did 
commit violence towards Rose, members of Rose’s family would or might 
suffer psychiatric injury as a result. 
Secondly, the public authority had very significant control over Pettigrove. 
This helps to distinguish the case of Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra155 where the 
High Court dismissed a claim that police had breached a duty of care that they 
owed to the plaintiff and her husband. Police had observed the plaintiff’s 
husband in a stationary vehicle with a hose pipe running from the exhaust to 
the interior of the vehicle, but had declined to exercise their power to detain 
him, although they believed he was suffering from a mental illness. One of the 
reasons the Court gave in denying that a duty of care existed was the lack of 
control that the police had over the husband. This was manifested in the fact 
that the police did not control the source of the risk to the man, and they did 
not put the man in harm’s way.156 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ contrasted 
this with the position that would have existed if the man had been in police 
custody and hence under police control.157 In McKenna, however, the 
defendant did control the source of the risk. The police had involuntarily 
detained Pettigrove and decided to release him. By so doing, they had put 
those who might come into contact with Pettigrove in harm’s way. The 
defendant had put him in involuntarily detention as the legislation empowered 
it to do, and had the power to continue to detain him. The power to detain 
someone against the person’s will is one of the most significant powers that a 
person or organisation can possess in relation to another. 
Thirdly, the plaintiffs were vulnerable. They had no control over the release of 
Pettigrove. They had no means of knowing what condition Pettigrove was 
155 (2009) 237 CLR 215. 
156 Ibid 255 (Gummow Hayne and Heydon JJ), 261–3 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
157 Ibid 255. 
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suffering from, and what it might lead him to do. They did not know what 
medication he was on. There is no evidence that they were aware of his long-
term mental health history, or his previous suicide attempts. They had no say 
in whether Pettigrove was released or not, nor whether he should be released 
into the care of a friend to share a long journey. There was no way they could 
protect themselves from the injuries they suffered. They were not in a position 
to determine the danger that their son/brother was in by volunteering to share 
this journey as a friendly gesture. They did not have the professional expertise 
to make this assessment.158 
Fourthly, the defendant ought to have appreciated that to release Pettigrove 
when they did posed risks to people like the plaintiffs. They knew he had a 20 
year mental illness. They knew he was suffering from psychosis and auditory 
hallucinations. They knew he often did not take his medication, and was very 
lightly medicated at the time he was released. They knew he was to embark 
on a journey of 1200 kilometres in a car, and they knew that being out at 
night, and being in a confined space, both of which would occur during the 
journey, would increase the risk of a relapse. If they knew that this presented 
real risks to the person Pettigrove would share the car with, Rose, then they 
must have known that, if Rose should suffer serious injury or death, this could 
well cause psychiatric injury to members of Rose’s family. Case law has, 
eventually,159 recognised that death or injury to a person may well lead to 
psychiatric injury to others who were close to the person, including family 
members.160 
The High Court has repeatedly shown concern at the spectre of indeterminate 
liability. Would recognition of a duty of care in this particular situation create 
158 Nor, indeed, did Rose, although the claim of Rose’s family members is considered 
independent of any claim that Rose might have had. Some argue that had Rose survived, the 
defendant might have been able to successfully use the defence of volenti non fit injuria. 
However, this requires a full appreciation of the risks taken on, and it is unlikely that Rose did 
fully appreciate the risk, given that he was not an expert in mental health, was not aware of 
what medication Pettigrove was or was not on, etc. It is likely that he simply relied on the 
expertise of the defendant in determining, having regard to the risk that the person posed to 
the defendant and others, that the patient was not suffering a mental illness or mental disorder 
such as would or might lead to involuntary detention. 
159 The days of Chester v The Council of the Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1, where 
three of the four High Court judges presiding could say that it was not a ‘normal’ or expected 
(foreseeable) reaction that a mother would suffer psychiatric injury after seeing her drowned 
son retrieved from a trench (10 (Latham CJ), 11 (Rich J), 13 (Starke J)), are thankfully long 
gone. 
160 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
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indeterminate liability? The answer, it is suggested, is ‘no’.161 The plaintiffs 
were family members of a victim with whom Pettigrove was sharing a 
confined space, with the knowledge of the public authority. The victim 
collected Pettigrove from hospital. One of the doctors had spoken with the 
victim directly about the travel arrangements. The plaintiffs were family 
members of the victim. In those circumstances, recognition of a duty of care 
does not create the spectre of indeterminate liability to an unascertainable 
class. The class includes the person to whom the mental patient was released, 
and the family members of that person. It is not necessary to speculate as to 
whether others are within the class of those who might be able to sue in such a 
situation.162  
However, if recent experience with the law of tort has taught us anything, it is 
that it can be dangerous to try to answer every question in one case, with a 
comprehensive statement of all the occasions in which liability will be owed 
for this or that wrong, or with definitive expositions of which principles cover 
all cases. This is too ambitious a task, at least in this area, and an incremental, 
case by case approach more consistent with general common law 
development is now favoured.163 Therefore, to say that members of Rose’s 
family were owed a duty of care by the mental health authority in this case is 
not to comprehensively identify all possible members of the class that might 
be entitled to sue for a negligent release from mental health care. And it does 
not raise the spectre of unmanageable, indeterminate liability. Empirical 
evidence from the United States is instructive here.164 It shows that the 
prospects of successfully suing for negligent failure to protect, or failure to 
warn, remain low, even in a country often caricatured as being excessively 
litigious and the home of law suits that defy common sense, yet succeed.  
161 This was the same answer given by Macfarlan JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
(with whom Beazley P agreed): ‘This concern [regarding indeterminate liability] is not in my 
view applicable in the present case as the plaintiffs’ claim arises out of harm being suffered 
by a specific individual, Mr Rose, with whom the Hospital had direct dealings and into whose 
custody the hospital released Mr Pettigrove’: McKenna v Hunter and New England Local 
Health District [2014] NSWCA 476 [97].  
162 It should be recalled, however, that the High Court has been prepared to frame the ‘class’ to 
whom the duty of care is owed very broadly. An instance was Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, where the duty was framed as being owed by the public 
authority to users of their roads. 
163 Lord Wright declared the common law way was to go ‘from case to case, like the ancient 
Mediterranean mariners, hugging the coast from point to point, and avoiding the dangers of 
the open sea of system or science’: ‘The Study of Law’ (1938) 54 The Law Quarterly Review 
185, 186; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 216–7 (McHugh J). 
164 See n 129. 
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And fifthly, to find a duty of care here would not intrude on the authority’s 
core policy making or quasi-legislative functions, since it does not have any. 
This duty of care relates to an operational decision about a particular patient. 
In terms of the past distinction between policy and operational decisions, it is 
clearly at the operational end, dealing as it does with the treatment of a 
particular patient. Recognition of a duty of care works with, and is not at 
cross-purposes with, the policy in this area that is identified in the relevant 
legislation. Such policy includes the principle that, in considering whether to 
subject a person to involuntary detention, the decision maker must consider 
the risk that the person poses to others. The recognition of such a duty in the 
United States has proven to be workable. 
C Other Arguments 
Legislation in the slightly different context of the preventive detention of past 
sex offenders also gives us some cause for reflection here. (This comparison 
is not intended to equate those prisoners who have been convicted of a crime, 
and those who are suffering from mental illness; however some features of the 
legislation governing convicted sex offenders are relevant). Several states 
have legislation permitting the court to make an order continuing the 
incarceration of a past sex offender, based on a psychiatric assessment of the 
likelihood that the offender will re-offend. For instance, section 11 of the 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) provides for a 
psychiatrist’s report to be obtained in relation to an application for the 
detention of a convicted sex offender past the date upon which the offender 
would otherwise be eligible for release. Section 11(2) indicates that the 
psychiatrist’s report must indicate the level of risk that the offender will 
commit another serious sexual offence if released. Similarly, section 6(3)(b) 
of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) requires a report of a 
qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical 
practitioner to be obtained which includes an indication of the likelihood of 
the offender committing further sex offences. These reports help determine 
whether or not the person is to be released into the general community after a 
period of involuntary detention. 
Two observations can be made regarding these provisions (putting aside 
arguments regarding the accuracy with which psychiatrists can in fact predict 
future behaviour, a contested area of debate into which it is not necessary to 
venture).165 Firstly, they reflect the fact that psychiatrists are routinely called 
165 Bernadette McSherry, ‘Sex, Drugs and ‘Evil’ Souls: The Growing Reliance on Preventive 
Detention Regimes’ (2006) 32(2) Monash University Law Review 237, 268–9. 
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upon to make an assessment regarding a person’s likely future conduct, 
including likely wrongdoing that will harm others. Therefore it is clear that 
recognition of a duty of care in the circumstances in McKenna would not 
impose on relevant persons a responsibility for which their training makes 
them unprepared or unqualified. To say this is not to downplay the difficulty 
of predicting future dangerousness. The American evidence referred to above 
supports this.166 The psychiatrists surveyed indicated that the question of 
public safety was always paramount in the minds of decision makers 
considering involuntary detention. 
Secondly, this type of legislation requires courts to balance the report of the 
psychiatric experts with other factors, including (specifically) public safety.167 
The courts have not found it impossible to balance a range of factors, 
including: the general expectation that a person who has served the full gaol 
term to which they have been sentenced will be freed; the expectation that the 
public will be kept safe; the likelihood of the detainee re-offending; the extent 
to which the person has been rehabilitated, and so forth. No one says it is easy 
for a decision maker to balance this range of factors in particular cases, but 
the legislation clearly contemplates that this kind of balancing exercise will 
occur. Given this, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a psychiatrist, 
acting pursuant to legislation permitting involuntarily detention (expressly as 
a last resort), to have regard to public safety. It is reasonable to expect the 
psychiatrist to assess the risk that the person already detained or who could 
possibly be detained under the legislation will offend unless detained. In 
applying this duty of care, the court would take into account that the 
legislation specifically states that involuntary detention of someone suffering 
a mental illness is a last resort. This feature of the legislation should shape the 
scope and context of the duty of care owed; but it should not preclude it.168 
Briefly, in Australia in the late 1970s and early 1980s, , the test applied to 
determine cases of alleged negligence explicitly considered whether questions 
of public policy negated the existence of a duty of care.169 The High Court 
166 See discussion in the text associated with nn 130 and 131. 
167 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(4)(i); Crimes (High Risk 
Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) s 9(3)(a). 
168 ‘Proper application of the least restrictive principle should be incorporated, in but not 
dominate, the evaluation of whether a proper basis for involuntariness was present and 
therefore whether a reasonable psychiatrist in the psychiatrist’s position would have taken the 
precaution of imposition or maintenance of the person’s involuntary inpatient status’: 
Freckelton, above n 144, 289. This reflects the position of Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow 
JJ in Brodie (see discussion in the text associated with n 50). 
169 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
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rejected that approach in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman,170 but there is 
sporadic express reference to such policy in the case law,171 and some justices 
may be having regard to such matters in reaching their conclusions. Some of 
the civil liability statutes make express reference to such matters, at least in 
the context of public authorities.172 Clearly policy factors are still relevant in 
the United Kingdom.173 To the extent that public policy is relevant here, it is 
worth recalling the sentiment of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in X (Minors) v 
Bedfordshire County Council174 — that the rule of public policy which has 
first claim on the loyalty of the law is that stating that wrongs should be 
remedied. Clearly, there is strong public interest in upholding high standards 
in medical endeavours, and legal principle should reflect community 
expectations.175 Individuals expect governments to take reasonable steps to 
protect their safety. When a duty of care is imposed on virtually all other 
professionals, it is hard to justify what effectively seems to be a new 
immunity in the area of mental health service providers.176 Recognition that a 
duty of care exists can have positive benefits in terms of encouraging high 
standards and appropriate care within a particular field; the opposite also 
holds.177 This point has been the subject of a quantitative study.178 
170 (1984) 157 CLR 424, 465 (Mason J), 481 (Brennan J), 508 (Deane J), (Gibbs CJ (437) and 
Wilson J (471) dissenting). In the case of Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2008) 237 CLR 215 (a 
High Court case involving an allegation against police for failing to exercise a power), there is 
no mention in any of the judgments about policy considerations that arise with respect to 
claims against police, in sharp contrast to the United Kingdom case law where consideration 
of policy has been significant in this context. 
171 Eg Crimmins v Stevedoring Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39 (McHugh J); Graham Barclay 
Oysters v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 578 (McHugh J); policy concerns underlie the High 
Court’s maintenance of barrister immunity from suit: D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid 
(2005) 223 CLR 1. 
172 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Part 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Part 12; Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld) Chapter 2 Part 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) Part 1C; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) Part 9; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Chapter 8. 
173 A recent example appears in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 2 
WLR 343, 371 [122], explicitly discussing the financial consequences if police were held to 
owe a duty of care to victims of crime. 
174 [1995] 2 AC 633. 
175 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
176 Indeed, the general trend has been towards abolishing immunities from suit rather than 
creating more (Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512), though some 
traditional immunities remain, at least in Australia: D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid 
(2005) 223 CLR 1. 
177 Freckelton, above n 144, 289: ‘protection from liability in negligence extended to 
psychiatrists (and the hospitals in which they provide their services) in the McKenna and 
Presland decisions has gone beyond what is defensible in terms of legal principle, creates a 
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V CONCLUSION 
The law has in the past been protective of the position of the Crown, in 
relation to legal liability, as in other matters. While such formal protection has 
largely been abolished, judicial reluctance to find the Crown liable in 
negligence remains. This reluctance now appears in different guises, including 
concerns expressed about resource implications, claims about inconsistency 
between a public authority’s statutory duties and common law liability, and 
fears of indeterminate liability. This affects those who claim to have suffered 
loss from the negligence of mental health service providers, since the vast 
majority of such providers are public authorities. Further common law 
principles, such as the general reluctance to make one person liable for the 
actions or omissions of another, create difficulties for those seeking 
compensation in such circumstances.  
Despite these difficulties, courts have been more prepared to find that public 
authorities owe a duty of care to others when there has evidently been an 
assumption of responsibility, where control is present, and where the plaintiffs 
are particularly vulnerable. It has been argued that, according to the factors 
that the High Court has itself accepted and applied, a mental health authority 
that has involuntarily detained an individual does have the kind of control 
over that individual, and has assumed a responsibility towards them, such that 
injury that the person causes if prematurely and negligently released could be 
compensable against those authorities.  
It has been argued in this article that the High Court’s rejection of a recent 
claim fitting these parameters was incorrect. The High Court was too quick to 
find an inconsistency between the legislation and a common law duty. It did 
so upon a clearly selective and incomplete reading of the legislation. It is hard 
to find that a common law duty of care to family members of a victim of the 
person released is inconsistent with the legislation when the legislation 
specifically states that one of the two factors that experts should take into 
account in deciding whether a mentally ill person should be involuntarily 
category of lack of accountability that is not conceptually or clinically justified, and may well 
have undesirably counter-therapeutic consequences’; Freckelton, above n 143, 403. 
178 Lucinda Platt, Maurice Sunkin and Kerman Calvo, ‘Judicial Review Litigation as an 
Incentive to Change in Local Authority Public Services in England and Wales’ (2010) 20(2) 
Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 243, who concluded that litigation could 
act as a ‘modest driver to improvements in local government services’. The Law Commission 
also reflected on the potential positive benefits to litigation, in the context of 
recommendations to streamline the law with respect to public authority liability in private 
law: The Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Report 
No 322 (2010) [4.27].  
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detained is public safety. The High Court ‘dealt with’ this inconvenient reality 
by not discussing those sections of the Act. It suggests an over-keenness to 
protect the government purse, using inconsistency of obligations as a fig leaf 
that, annoyingly, does not fit the actual words in the Act. American authorities 
have considered, and rejected, arguments that the recognition of such a duty 
of care would conflict with the authorities’ duty to their patients. There is 
empirical evidence suggesting that the recognition of such a duty does not 
make the life of mental health professionals unbearable, is not unreasonable, 
and does not impose on them intolerable ethical conflicts. The floodgates have 
not opened, and it has not led to defensive practice. The High Court would do 
well to reflect on such evidence, rather than make unjustified assumptions that 
the research literature does not reflect. Fundamentally, we believe in the rule 
of law — that legal principles apply to all. The trend in negligence law is 
away from special privileges for particular groups. The imposition of a duty 
of care can have positive effects on the quality of care and service provided. 
The opposite also holds, as this case may tragically reflect. 
